Criminal Law by Jones, Jerry N.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 62 
Issue 1 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 14 
February 2021 
Criminal Law 
Jerry N. Jones 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Jerry N. Jones, Criminal Law, 62 Denv. U. L. Rev. 125 (1985). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
CRIMINAL LAW
OVERVIEW
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals up-
held most trial court convictions, reading the federal criminal statutes
broadly to expand federal jurisdiction over various forms of criminal
conduct. Conspirators' claims of guilt by association, allegedly a result
of their multiple-defendant trials, continued to fail. The court approved
the use of the Mail Fraud Act and the Hobbs Act as federal tools to
combat local political corruption. Many of the political corruption cases
resulted from a cooperative investigation, by United States and
Oklahoma law enforcement officials, undertaken to discover and elimi-
nate the wide-spread corruption among Oklahoma County
Commissioners.
A large number of appeals arose out of the anti-nuclear protests
which occurred in April of 1979 at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Plant in Col-
orado. The issues raised in these appeals, however, were controlled by
Tenth Circuit decisions handed down during the previous survey pe-
riod. Therefore, this survey will focus on the Tenth Circuit's significant
decisions concerning drug distribution conspiracies and those decisions
which expanded federal jurisdiction under various federal criminal stat-
utes included in Title 18 of the United States Code.
I. CONSPIRACY
For two or more to confederate and combine together to commit or cause to
be committed a breach of the criminal laws, is an offense of the gravest
character, sometimes quite outweighing, in injury to the public, the mere
commission of the contemplated crime.
Justice Mahlon Pitney'
If there are still any citizens interested in protecting human liberty, let
them study the conspiracy law, of the United States.
Clarence Darrow
2
In criminal conspiracy trials, as in all trials with multiple defendants,
the need for efficient prosecution must be weighed against each defend-
ant's right to have his guilt individually determined.3 Defendants fre-
quently charge that juries allow the guilt of alleged co-conspirators to
"spill over" on to themselves. Federal courts have been accused of ig-
noring these sometimes legitimate claims by mechanically applying in-
1. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915).
2. C. DARROW, THE STORY OF My LIFE, 64 (1932).
3. Prosecutors argue that only by trying all members of a conspiracy together can a
jury. get a clear picture of the whole operation. See Note, Connecting Defendants to Conspira-
cies: The Slight Evidence Rule and the Federal Courts, 64 VA. L. REv. 881, 884 (1978); Note,
Application of Conspiracy Statute to Prosecution for Sale of Counterfeit Money, 48 YALE L.J. 1447,
1450 (1939).
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adequate standards and methods of inquiry.
4
The Tenth Circuit recently reaffirmed its tests for determining the
existence of a conspiracy as well as its tests for determining an individual
defendant's involvement in a conspiracy. The most detailed treatment
of these issues occurred in United States v. Dickey 5 and United States v.
Pilling.6 Both cases arose out of wide-ranging drug ventures involving
numerous actors and transactions.
This portion of the criminal law survey will, through an analysis of
the Dickey and Pilling decisions, criticize the Tenth Circuit's treatment of
criminal conspiracy law. In particular, this analysis questions whether
the Tenth Circuit's treatment is consistent with the nature and elements
of the crime of conspiracy, and with the ideal of guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt.
A. An Overview of Criminal Conspiracy
The crime of conspiracy consists of an agreement to accomplish an
unlawful purpose. 7 Conspiracy is punishable separately from the sub-
stantive offense contemplated or committed. The rationale for this
treatment is that the law of criminal conspiracy serves purposes distinct
from those involved in the punishment of substantive crimes. Accord-
ingly, the criminalization of conspiracy prevents criminal activity before
it occurs and protects society from the dangers inherent in partnerships
in crime.8 Group criminality is said to increase the likelihood that crime
will be committed. Furthermore, a group of conspirators, through an
efficient division of labor, may be able to achieve more sophisticated and
harmful objects than an individual could otherwise achieve. 9 Group ac-
tivity may also prepare individuals to commit crimes on a regular ba-
sis. 10 Critics have argued that these justifications are either overstated
or can be adequately served by the law of attempt."1
4. Note, "Single vs. Multiple" Criminal Conspiracies: A Uniform Method of Inquiry for Due
Process and Double Jeopardy Purposes, 65 MINN. L. REV. 295, 304 (1980). Some judges also
lament this development. See, e.g., United States v. Heath, 580 F.2d 1011, 1026 (10th Cir.
1978) (McKay, J., dissenting).
5. 736 F.2d 571 (10th Cir.), stay denied, 105 S. Ct. 24 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
957 (1985).
6. 721 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1983).
7. Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 203 (1893). The doctrine that agree-
ment is at the heart of conspiracy originated in The Poulterer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 813
(1611).
8. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAw 534 (1978); Marcus, Conspiracy: The
Criminal Agreement in Theory and in Practice, 65 GEO. L.J. 925, 929 (1977).
9. See Garland & Snow, The Co-Conspirators Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Procedural Im-
plementation and Confrontation Clause Requirements, 63 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
1, 2 (1972); Note, Conspiracy: Legitimate Instrument or Unconstitutional Weapon?, 3 COLUM.
SURV. HUM. RTS. 94, 102 (1971). See also, W. LAFAVE & A. Sco-rr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
LAW 459 (1972).
10. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915).
11. See, Marcus, supra note 8, at 937-38. See also Note, The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecu-
tion of Group Crime or Protection of Individual Defendants, 62 HARV. L. REV. 276, 285 (1948)
(arguing that conspiracy should only be punished if it greatly increases the likelihood that
a crime will be committed or where the crime contemplated is so serious that even a slight
increase in the possibility of its successful execution should be punished).
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In order to show the existence of an agreement involving each de-
fendant, the prosecution must prove: (1) knowledge of the main object
of the conspiracy; 12 (2) knowledge of the scope of the conspiracy, or at a
minimum knowledge of the involvement of another; and (3) specific in-
tent' 3 to join the conspiracy and commit the object offense.
14
Proving these elements can present substantial problems: because
of the secretive nature of the crime, there is usually little documentary
evidence indicating the existence of a conspiracy. However, most evi-
dentiary problems have been resolved in favor of the prosecution. Due
to the lack of documentary evidence, proof will normally be of three
basic types: (1) circumstantial evidence, 15 (2) the hearsay testimony of
co-conspirators, 16 and (3) evidence of out-of-court declarations or acts
of a co-conspirator or the defendant himself. 17 This evidence may give
rise to reasonable inferences from which a jury could find the existence
of an agreement. Conspiracy convictions are routinely based solely
upon such inferences and presumptions, a fact which has troubled many
commentators-but few courts.' 8 These commentators fear that, by pil-
ing inference upon inference, defendants may become victims of guilt by
association. Furthermore, the acts of one conspirator may be imputed
to a defendant with whom the conspirator has associated because of the
tendency to believe that "birds of a feather flock together."' 19 In re-
sponse, defenders of the conspiracy laws argue that less restrictive evi-
dentiary standards are necessary because of the secretive nature of
conspiracy and because society's general interest in preventing crime is
greater than its specific interest in avoiding erroneous punishment for
12. "If the parties are attempting to achieve different objects, an agreement cannot be
inferred." Tarlow, Defense of Federal Conspiracy Prosecution, 4 NAT'LJ. CRIM. DEF. 183, 187
(1978). See also United States v. Bastone, 526 F.2d 971, 980-81 (7th Cir. 1975), overruled
as to withdrawal from a conspiracy, United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1232-36 (7th
Cir. 1981); United States v. Kates, 508 F.2d 308, 311 (3d Cir. 1975).
13. Mere knowledge of a conspiracy will normally not support an inference of active
participation in the conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Sisca, 503 F.2d 1337, 1343 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974); Causey v. United States, 352 F.2d 203, 207 (5th
Cir. 1965). Intent can be inferred if a defendant supplies goods or services that have no
lawful use or where the quantity of goods supplied is more than is needed for any legiti-
mate purpose. See, e.g., Direct Sales Co. v, United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711-12 (1943).
14. Note, supra note 4, at 298.
15. United States v. Harris, 534 F.2d 207, 214 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
941 (1976).
16. Before co-conspirator hearsay evidence can be admitted "independent non-hear-
say evidence must establish the participation in the conspiracy of the person against
whom" the hearsay is to be admitted. United States v. DeFillipo, 590 F.2d 1228, 1234 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979). See also United States v. Andrews, 585 F.2d 961, 964
(10th Cir. 1978).
17. Note, Developments in the Law--Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REv. 920, 983-84
(1959).
18. "[A] common purpose and plan may be inferred from a 'development and a collo-
cation of circumstances.' " Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942) (quoting
United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1939)). But see Iannelli v. United
States, 420 U.S. 770, 778 n.10 (1975) ("reliance on [circumstantial evidence and infer-
ences drawn therefrom] has tended to obscure the basic fact that the agreement is the
essential evil at which the crime of conspiracy is directed.").
19. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 454 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
1984]
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the substantive offense. 20
Complicated drug distribution conspiracies magnify problems of
proof. Such schemes often involve many participants, multiple objects,
long periods of time and large geographical areas. 2 1 To confront the
obvious problems of proof involved in such conspiracies, most courts,
the Tenth Circuit included, look to the "nature of the enterprise" 22
rather than the existence of an agreement. Under this test, courts often
characterize a venture as a "chain" conspiracy or a "hub and spoke"
conspiracy. After finding one of these forms, slight evidence is sufficient
to connect an individual defendant to the conspiracy. The Tenth Circuit
recently used these conspiracy models in the cases of United States v.
Dickey 23 and United States v. Pilling.
24
B. United States v. Dickey: "Chain" Conspiracy
1. The Facts
Each of ten defendants was convicted in district court of one count
of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute mari-
juana and cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846.25 The
charges arose out of dozens of transactions involving many conspirators
over a period of approximately four years. Deals and meetings occurred
in states from Florida to California and millions of dollars changed
hands. 26 Two of the major participants pled guilty and testified as gov-
ernment witnesses. 2 7 The defendants included suppliers, distributors,
and retailers; some of the defendants performed more than one func-
tion. 28 Both the quality and quantity of the evidence, however, varied
greatly among the defendants.
On appeal, all ten defendants asserted that the evidence at trial es-
tablished multiple conspiracies rather than the single conspiracy
charged in the indictment. 29 All but two defendants also challenged the
20. See Note, 64 VA. L. REV., supra note 3, at 884-85.
21. Note, Resolution of the Multiple Conspiracies Issue Via A "Nature of the Enterprise" Analy-
sis: The Resurrection of Agreement, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 243, 253-54 (1975).
22. P. MARCUS, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY CASES 4-20
(1984). This is particularly true in narcotics conspiracy cases where courts are quick to
infer knowledge of the entire scheme based on the nature of drug distribution operations.
See infra notes 79-82, 98-103 and accompanying text.
23. 736 F.2d 571 (10th Cir.), stay denied, 105 S. Ct. 240 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
957 (1985).
24. 721 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1983).
25. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982) states in pertinent part: "Any person who attempts or
conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment
or fine or both .... " 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1982) sets forth the prohibited activities relating
to controlled substances and also states the penalties for violating those prohibitions.
26. 736 F.2d at 577-81.
27. Id. at 578. The government witnesses were Rodney Bragg and Doc Clanton.
Their testimony made up the vast majority of the evidence.
28. Id. at 578-81. For example, Robert Best took delivery of several hundred pounds
of marijuana on more than one occasion. He also made deliveries and several individual
sales of marijuana and cocaine.
29. Id. at 581. The importance of this distinction is discussed in note 33 infra.
[Vol. 62:1
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sufficiency of the evidence linking them to the overall conspiracy.3 0
These arguments are typical in conspiracy cases with multiple defend-
ants and complicated fact patterns.
3'
2. The Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit, Judge Barrett writing for the majority,3 2 found
no merit to the appellant's contention that the evidence showed the
existence of multiple conspiracies.3 3 The court held that a single con-
spiracy exists if the evidence shows that all of the defendants had a
"common, illicit goal."'3 4 This is known as the "common objective" test.
To determine if a common objective existed, the court examined
the nature of the enterprise and characterized the entire operation as a
"chain" conspiracy.3 5 In a chain conspiracy, the government must prove
that each defendant was dependent upon the success of each "link" in
the chain.3 6 Without much discussion, the court found that the evi-
dence clearly supported the finding that each participant, even the re-
mote members, was dependant upon the success of each transaction to
ensure the continued success of the enterprise.3 7 The court defined the
common objective of this chain as a goal "to possess and distribute drugs
(marijuana and cocaine) for profit. "38
As support for its conclusion that a common objective existed, the
court relied heavily on the volume of the drugs involved. Most circuits,
the Tenth Circuit included, readily presume that each major buyer knows
he is involved in a "wide-ranging venture." °39 If large quantities are in-
30. Id. at 583-86.
31. P. MARCUS, supra note 22, at 4-10.
32. Judge Logan joined Judge Barrett. Judge Mckay filed a separate opinion concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part, 736 F.2d at 599-601. See infra text accompanying notes
46-56.
33. If a defendant can show that the evidence at trial disclosed the existence of multi-
ple conspiracies rather than the single conspiracy charged in the indictment, the convic-
tion may be reversed because of the tendency of jurors to transfer guilt. See Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 766-67 (1946). The variance, however, between the indict-
ment for a single conspiracy and proof of separate conspiracies must be more than harm-
less error; it must be prejudicial to the rights of the defendant:
The Supreme Court has looked to the following factors to determine whether this
type of variance is prejudicial: (1) surprise to the defendant . . . , (2) possibility
of subsequent prosecution for the same offense, (3) likelihood of jury confusion
as measured by the number of conspirators charged and the number of separate
conspiracies proven, and (4) likelihood of jury confusion in light of the instruc-
tions given the jury limiting or excluding the use of certain evidence not relating
to the defendant.
United States v. Lindsey, 602 F.2d 785, 787 (7th Cir. 1979).
34. 736 F.2d at 582.
35. Id.
36. Id. See also infra notes 98-113 and accompanying text.
37. Id. at 582. This may be an overstatement since the facts showed that each transac-
tion was not successful. For example, several of the participants met in Las Cruces to
purchase marijuana. After testing the marijuana, they rejected it and all of the individuals
left. Id. at 578. This failure, however, is not crucial when viewed in the context of the
entire conspiracy.
38. Id. at 582 (emphasis in original).
39. Id. See also United States v. Magnano, 543 F.2d 431,434 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1091 (1977).
19841
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volved, the existence of multiple drugs or multiple transactions will not
necessarily translate into the existence of multiple conspiracies.
40
Citing United States v. Andrews,4 ' the court reaffirmed its approval of
the "slight evidence" test. Under the test, once the prosecution estab-
lishes a conspiracy it may connect a co-conspirator to it using only slight
evidence. 4 2 The court examined the evidence against each defendant
under the slight evidence standard and found sufficient evidence to con-
nect each defendant with the chain conspiracy.
43
Some defendants contended that the evidence showed only a buyer-
seller relationship between them and other actors. While admitting that
the existence of such a relationship would be insufficient to convict one
as a co-conspirator, the court found in each case that the testimony and
circumstantial evidence 44 gave rise to permissible inferences and pre-
sumptions that each defendant knew of the scope of the conspiracy.
45
3. Judge McKay's Opinion
Judge McKay filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment as
to all of the defendants except Friedrich.46 In his view, there was insuffi-
cient evidence to connect Friedrich to the overall conspiracy. Judge Mc-
Kay expressed his concern, previously stated in United States v. Heath,
4 7
that the Tenth Circuit's analysis of conspiracy appeals is inconsistent
with the very nature of the offense. By substituting proof of "knowl-
edge" for the proof of an agreement, McKay argued that the court took
an undisciplined approach. 48 In his view, the knowledge test results in
the conviction of persons engaged only in a buyer-seller relationship. 4 9
Judge McKay felt that the evidence against Friedrich showed only a
buyer-seller relationship and no agreement to join the larger conspir-
acy. 50 Friedrich sold two kilograms of cocaine to a government witness,
Clanton, on two separate occasions. 51 Judge McKay stated that this
showed only illicit sales and that proof of illicit sales, without showing
knowledge of the broader drug distribution conspiracy or its objective,
40. 736 F.2d at 582 (citing United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436, 454 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982)).
41. 585 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1978).
42. Id. at 964. See also infra notes 114-29 and accompanying text.
43. 736 F.2d at 583-86. Two defendants did not challenge the sufficiency of the evi-
dence but the court nevertheless reviewed the record as to them and found the evidence
sufficient. Id. at 583-84.
44. The circumstantial evidence consisted entirely of evidence of phone calls, cash-
ier's checks, and an airplane used to transport drugs and conspirators. This evidence did
not relate to all of the defendants; the testimony of the government witnesses was the
primary source of evidence against each defendant.
45. 736 F.2d at 583-86.
46. Id. at 599 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47. 580 F.2d 1011 (10th Cir.) (McKay, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1075
(1978).
48. 736 F.2d at 599, 601.
49. Id. at 600.
50. Id. at 600-01.
51. Id. at 600.
[Vol. 62:1
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is insufficient to connect a defendant to the conspiracy. 52 Friedrich also
made fifty-one telephone calls to defendant Hall. 5 3 Citing United States
v. Galvan,54 Judge McKay stated that evidence of phone calls is also in-
sufficient to link a defendant to a conspiracy.
55
Although Judge McKay's analytical separation of the sales from the
phone calls is questionable (taken together, they present a closer ques-
tion of guilt than Judge McKay admits), his main point is well taken.
Many federal courts have adopted standards and tests for conspiracy
cases which are inconsistent with the basic elements of, and the ratio-
nales for, the crime of conspiracy.
56
C. United States v. Pilling: "Hub and Spoke" Conspiracy
1. The Facts
In Pilling,57 four defendants (Pilling, Penix, Varley, and Christen-
sen) were convicted by a jury of conspiring with three other persons 58
to import cocaine from Peru into the United States in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 952. 59 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the convictions of each de-
fendant. Three core, or hub, conspirators made two separate visits to
Peru for the purpose of obtaining cocaine to distribute in the United
States. The four defendants each invested thousands of dollars in each
trip. With the exception of Penix and Christensen, who were business
partners, the defendants were contacted separately by the hub
conspirators.
6 0
The "front" (or "cover") for the first trip was the promotion of Pro-
methean Tile of Eagle, Colorado (a financially-troubled business owned
by hub conspirators Kleist and Richards), in South America. 6 1 For the
second trip, Five Star Chemical Company, owned by defendant Pilling,
was used as the front.6 2 Peruvian officials spotted the second shipment
of cocaine before it left the country and notified the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) which then kept the shipment under sur-
veillance. When Kleist, Richards, and James attempted to claim the
52. Id. at 600-01 (citing Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 712 (1943)).
53. 736 F.2d at 600-01.
54. 693 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1982).
55. Id. at 419-20.
56. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
57. 721 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1983).
58. The three, James, Richards, and Kleist, did the actual smuggling. Each plead
guilty to drug smuggling charges and James and Richards were government witnesses in
the Pilling trial. Id. at 289-90.
59. 21 U.S.C. § 952 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful to import into the customs territory of the United States
from any place outside thereof but within the United States, or to import into the
United States from any place outside thereof. any controlled substance in sched-
ule I or II of subchapter I of this chapter. or an. narcotic drug in schedule III, IV,
or V of subchapter I of this chapter. ...
60. 721 F.2d at 290-92.
61. Id. at 290.
62. Id. Five Star was also in desparate linancial straits.
1984]
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shipment, they were arrested. 63
The defendants were implicated through the testimony of James
and Richards. None of the defendants was charged with the actual pos-
session or distribution of cocaine.6 4 Furthermore, with the exception of
Penix and Christensen, there was no evidence that any of the defendants
had any actual knowledge of the participation of the other defendants.
On appeal, each defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evi-
dence against him. Each appellant also asserted that the evidence, if it
showed any conspiracy at all, showed the existence of multiple conspira-
cies and not the single conspiracy charged in the indictment.
6 5
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
All the defendants denied having knowledge of the scheme to im-
port cocaine from Peru. They strenuously asserted that they believed
they were investing in legitimate business ventures. 6 6 In an opinion
written by Judge Barrett, 67 the Tenth Circuit found that the testimony of
the hub conspirators, along with the circumstantial evidence presented,
was sufficient to support the jury finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. 6 8 The court attached great weight to the fact that there was no
written documentation for any of the investments. In effect, the court
stated that experienced businessmen, such as the defendants, record
large investments in writing if the purpose is legitimate. 69
The court found that the evidence supported the existence of one
conspiracy with one "common objective"-importation of cocaine from
Peru to the United States for profit. 70 In the Tenth Circuit's view, the
facts revealed a "hub and spoke" conspiracy. 7 1 The "hub and spoke"
conspiracy is not typical of drug smuggling enterprises but is used to
describe conspiracies involving a common "hub" of conspirators who
deal with independent investors, or "spokes." ' 72 After first finding that
the hub conspirators formed the conspiracy, the court had no trouble
finding that each of the defendants knowingly joined the conspiracy at
various points in its progression.
The hub and spoke conspiracy presents conceptual problems dis-
tinct from those of the chain conspiracy in Dickey. But the ultimate ques-
tion raised by the application of each is the same: do these models help
to show the existence of an agreement or do they "obscure as much as
63. Id. at 291.
64. Id. at 288. This is because none of the defendants, with the exception of Varley,
who received five ounces of cocaine, actually saw or received any cocaine. Id. at 290. The
defendants merely invested money with the smugglers with the understanding that they
would receive a substantial return on their investment. Id. at 293.
65. Id. at 292. The significance of this charge is discussed at note 33 supra.
66. Id. at 291.
67. Judges Seymour and Kerr joined Judge Barrett in the opinion.
68. 721 F.2d at 292.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 290-92.
72. See infra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 62:1
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[they] clarifly]? ' 73
D. Single v. Multiple Conspiracies: Use of the Common Objective Test
Defendants often assert that the evidence presented at trial shows
the existence of multiple conspiracies, rather than the single conspiracy
most frequently charged in an indictment. The distinction between sin-
gle and multiple conspiracies is crucial in practical and theoretical terms.
If the evidence does indeed show multiple conspiracies, the convictions
will often be reversed because of the tendency ofjurors to let guilt spill
over from one defendant to another. 74 A defendant could thereby be
connected to a conspiracy with which he had no contact. Guilt by associ-
ation is a potential problem in this context.
The prosecution will also enjoy several procedural and evidentiary
advantages if defendants are lumped together under a single conspiracy
charge. 7 5 The most significant of these advantages is that the govern-
ment can introduce the acts and statements of participants in transac-
tions both involving and not involving the defendant through the use of
the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. 76 Also, other eviden-
tiary rules or doctrines may be loosened so that evidence that is poten-
tially irrelevant as to a particular defendant will be admitted. 7 7 These
advantages pose the danger that an individual will be caught up in a
"dragnet" of confusing, irrelevant, and often voluminous testimony and
evidence.
78
The federal courts have adopted several tests to determine the
existence of a single conspiracy. 79 Many courts concede that they will
go to great lengths to find a single conspiracy, especially in cases involv-
ing drug operations.8" The Tenth Circuit adopted the "common objec-
73. United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 383 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960
(1964).
74. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 766-67 (1946).
75. The procedural advantages include the selection of venue and jurisdiction. Fur-
thermore, a showing of multiple conspiracies can "extend a statute of limitations by al-
lowing the imputation of acts of participants in one transaction, that occurred within the
statutory period, to participants in an earlier transaction who would otherwise be pro-
tected by the statute." See Tarlow, supra note 12, at 225. See also Note, 65 MINN. L. REV.
295, supra note 4, at 298-99 nn. 15 & 16.
76. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E). See generally Note, 64 VA. L. REV. 881, supra note 3.
See also Note, Inconsistencies in the Federal Circuit Courts' Application of the Coconspirator Exception,
39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 125 (1982); Note, Evolution of the Coconspirator Exception to the Hear-
say Rule in the Federal Courts, 16 NEw EvG. L. REv. 617 (1981).
77. "Most conspiracy convictions are based on circumstantial evidence, and this evi-
dence is often admitted under rather loose standards of relevance." W. LAFAVE & A.
Scorr, supra note 9, at 457.
78. United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.), afd, 311 U.S. 205 (1940).
See also United States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330, 1344-45 (10th Cir.) (McKay, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979); United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51, 57 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 945 (1974).
79. For a detailed discussion of these various tests, see Note, supra note 4.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1975):
This Circuit has gone quite far in finding single conspiracies in narcotics
cases. . . . Despite the existence of multiple groups within an alleged conspir-
acy, we have considered them as part of one integrated loose-knit combination in
instances where there existed "mutual dependence and assistance" among the
1984]
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tive" test. 8 1 Under this test, if it can be shown that the defendants
shared a common objective and that each defendant acted in further-
ance of that objective, the court will infer that each defendant had
knowledge of the scope of the conspiracy. From that knowledge it will
infer that each defendant agreed upon the common goal and intended
to further that goal.
8 2
In drug conspiracy cases the Tenth Circuit often resorts to the use
of figurative models, such as the "chain" or "hub and spoke," to help
determine the existence of a common objective.8 3 These models pres-
ent distinct and troublesome problems in the context of proving the
existence of an agreement as to each defendant.
1. The Hub and Spoke Conspiracy: A Poor Model
The "hub and spoke" or "wheel" conspiracy consists of a "hub"
made up of one or several persons, and "spokes," peripheral members
that have no contact with each other.8 4 Each spoke deals only with the
hub. This model is not as typical of drug distribution schemes as is the
"chain," but it does traditionally involve situations like that in Pilling8 5
where individual investors deal directly with a person or group who con-
tacts investors on an individual basis.8 6 Unless it can be shown that the
spokes knew, or had reason to know, of each other's existence, there will
be several separate conspiracies. If that knowledge is shown, the jury
can infer that the spokes agreed to join the larger conspiracy.
8 7
The Tenth Circuit has used the "common objective" test as a sub-
stitute for a showing of knowledge and agreement. If the jury finds that
the spokes had a "common, illicit goal" (for example, importation of
spheres,. . . a common aim or purpose among the participants, or a permissible
inference, from the nature and scope of the operation, that each actor was aware
of his part in a larger organization where others performed similar roles equally
important to the success of the venture.
Id. at 154.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330, 1340 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 840 (1979); United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1326 (10th Cir. 1979) (quoting
United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 901 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953
(1978)), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980).
82. See Note, supra note 4, at 315-16. The parties must each intend to cooperate in
furthering the common goal. United States v. Downen, 496 F.2d 314, 319 (10th Cir.)
(knowledge or acquiescence in the object of the conspiracy without agreement to cooper-
ate does not make out a conspiracy), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974). See generally Marcus,
Criminal Conspiracy: The State of Mind Crime-Intent, Proving Intent, and Anti-Federal Intent,
1976 U. ILL. L.F. 627.
83. See, e.g., Dickey, 736 F.2d at 582; Pilling, 721 F.2d at 289-90; Petersen, 611 F.2d at
1325-27.
84. Note, Federal Treatment of Multiple Conspiracies, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 385, 388-89
(1957).
85. United States v. Pilling, 721 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1983).
86. Such a situation existed in a non-narcotics context in Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750 (1946). Several independent conspirators hired a person to act as a broker in
securing federal loans with fraudulent applications. No "rim" was shown to tie these
spokes together and the convictions were reversed because the Court found that the evi-
dence showed several small conspiracies rather than one large conspiracy. Id. at 772-74.
87. See generally Note, supra note 84.
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cocaine from Peru for profit), 88 then the court will infer knowledge.8 9
Knowledge of the other spokes is the "rim" that ties the spokes together
into a single conspiracy.9 0
The problems with the common objective test, in the context of the
hub and spoke conspiracy, are substantial. The test does not reveal if
the spoke members reached an agreement. By inferring the element of
knowledge, the courts make the mistake of treating an agreement be-
tween the hub members and individual spokes as an agreement among
the spokes.9 ' Since the core members have actual knowledge of the
scope of the operation and are dependent upon the participation of the
spokes, it follows that the hub agrees with each spoke. It does not follow
that the spokes agree with each other.
A common objective is not the same as an agreement. Application
of the common objective test to a "hub and spoke" conspiracy tends to
bring "crimes of a similar nature" under the umbrella of a single con-
spiracy. 92 The common objective test shifts the focus away from the
existence of an agreement among the spokes. Indeed, each spoke mem-
ber may have contemplated a separate conspiracy.
The Tenth Circuit's analysis in Pilling falls prey to these problems.
The court simply equated a common goal with a single conspiracy, a
misconception common to the federal courts' application of the com-
mon objective test.9 3 No attempt was made to show that the spoke de-
fendants had any knowledge of each other's involvement. The court did
state that the defendants knew about the cover-up plans, 9 4 but it is un-
clear if this knowledge included knowledge of Pilling's involvement or
merely knowledge that the hub conspirators intended to falsely promote
a business in Peru. If the individual spokes had no knowledge of the
involvement of the other spoke members, then the spokes were attached
to the single conspiracy simply because of association with the hub con-
spirators. 9 5 Without knowledge of other spokes, Kotleakos v. United
States9 6 would control. The hub and spoke conspiracy alleged in Kot-
teakos was "rimless" as the spoke defendants were not aware of the
larger conspiracy; accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the conspir-
acy conviction due to prejudicial variance between the evidence and the
88. See Pilling, 721 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1983).
89. See United States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330, 1337 (10th Cir.) (knowledge may be
inferred from a single act, depending upon the nature of the act), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840
(1979).
90. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 755. See also United States v. Levine, 546 F.2d 658, 663 (5th
Cir. 1977).
91. Note, supra note 84, at 389.
92. Goldstein, The Krulewitch Warning: Guilt by Association, 54 GEo. l.J. 133, 147-48
(1965).
93. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
94. 721 F.2d at 292.
95. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 766-67.
96. 328 U.S. 750 (1946). It is also argued that the hub conspirators, and not the
spoke conspirators, represent the true danger to society. Tarlow, supra note 12. at 230-3 1.
The threat to society from the crime of conspiracy is discussed in the text accompanying
notes 7-11 supra.
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indictment.
9 7
2. The Chain Conspiracy
Goods tend to travel along a chain of distribution from manufac-
turer to supplier to ultimate purchaser. The purpose of each participant
in the distribution chain is to assure that the commodity reaches its des-
tination. That too is the common objective of chain conspirators. Each
link or level in the chain is dependent upon the successful operation of
each of the other links. This is the basis of the chain conspiracy model,
and is typically used in cases involving large-scale narcotics
operations.98
If the requisite element of interdependence is shown, a jury
presented with evidence of each defendant's actions may infer that each
link knew or had reason to know of the other links. 99 Thus, the jury can
find that each knowledgeable link agreed with all other links in the chain
to join the larger conspiracy.10 0 Because direct proof that a defendant
knew of his dependence upon the other links is seldom available, the
fact finder can infer knowledge from the nature of the enterprise and the
facts and circumstances surrounding each participant.' 0 '
The courts almost automatically apply this model to narcotics enter-
prises. They quickly characterize a drug conspiracy as a chain because
the very nature of that form of enterprise lends itself to an inference of
interdependence.' 0 2 As a threshold requirement, thejury must find that
the links were truly dependent upon each other for their individual suc-
cesses. Once the jury finds dependence, a single chain conspiracy exists,
and only slight evidence is needed to connect an individual defendant to
that conspiracy.10 3 This implies that each link knew or must have known
that the venture did not begin and end with his actions.
Conspiracies, however, are usually too complex to be characterized
by a simplistic structural form. The danger with the chain conspiracy
model, and all structural models, is that it characterizes the conspiracy
97. 328 U.S. at 772-77. The Court noted that "as [the conspiracy charge] is broad-
ened to include more and more, in varying degrees of attachment to the Confederation,
the possibilities for miscarriage of justice to particular individuals becomes greater and
greater." Id. at 776.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Duckett, 550 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1977); See also United
States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1962); Valentine v. United States, 293 F.2d 708,
711 (8th Cir. 1961) (commenting that the law of conspiracy is somewhat broader when
drug conspiracies are involved), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 830 (1962); United States v. Bruno,
105 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1939), r,'d on other grounds, 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 907 (1980); United States v. Kostoff, 585 F.2d 378, 380 (9th Cir. 1978).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Magnano, 543 F.2d 431, 434 (2d Cir. 1976) ("nature of
the enterprise determines whether this presumption or inference of knowledge of broader
scope and participation in it single conspiracy is justified"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091
(1977). See also P. MARtCtUs. supra note 22, at 4-13, 4-20, and 4-25.
101. Such facts otttn include the size and frequency of the transaction involved. See
inf'a notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
102. See generallr Note. supra note 21.
103. Sri infra tt's 114-29 and accompanying text.
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as a group of people rather than as an agreement. 10 4 The finding of
interdependence, commonly inferred from the volume of the transac-
tions, leads to an inference of knowledge which ultimately permits the
jury to conclude that an individual defendant agreed to join the larger
conspiracy. 105
The relationship of the evidence to an agreement can become so
tenuous as to be nonexistent. Although agreements may rarely be
proved by direct evidence, the government should at least have to show
that the participants knew, or should have known, of each other's in-
volvement. Unfortunately, knowledge of interdependence is frequently
inferred solely on the basis of the quantity of drugs involved. 10 6 Even
though the courts have "recognized" that a buyer-seller relationship is
not sufficient to connect an individual to a conspiracy,' 0 7 many circuits
continue to hold that where large quantities of drugs are involved, a
buyer knows that he is part of a wide-ranging venture.' 0 8 The rationale
for this conclusion is that a purchaser of large quantities of narcotics
must know that the chain of distribution did not begin with his seller. 10 9
The logical fallacy in this reasoning is subtle but nonetheless crucial.
Courts use the nature of the enterprise (the chain) in combination with
the transaction of a large quantity of drugs to infer interdependence.
But interdependence must first be shown to prove the existence of the
chain. Therefore, the courts are implicitly assuming the existence of a
chain conspiracy in order to ultimately prove that one actually exists.
A common objective should be no substitute for an agreement.
The fact that one actor desires to possess and distribute marijuana for
profit does not mean that he knows of others who intend to do the same.
The objective of the actors would be "common" only in the sense that
they intend to commit similar crimes. I 10
104. United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 384 (2d Cir. 1964) (citing Note, supra note
17, at 923), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965). See also Note, supra note 21, at 265. The
requirement of agreement has been minimized, especially in narcotics cases. See Tarlow,
supra note 12, at 189.
105. See, e.g., United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921, 922 (2d Cir. 1939), rev'd on other
grounds, 308 U.S. 287 (1939). See also Note, supra note 86, at 390; Note, supra note 4, at
303.
106. See, e.g., United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436, 454 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 991, 457 U.S. 1137,459 U.S. 832 (1982); United States v. Heath, 580 F.2d 1011,
1022 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1075 (1979); United States v. Leong, 536 F.2d
993. 995-96 (2d Cir.) (knowledge of scope inferred from large amount of heroin distrib-
uted), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976). It has been argued that "under accepted theories
of criminal intent, knowledge that actions are substantially certain to have a prohibited
result has the same legal effect as intending that result." Tarlow, Defense of a Federal Crimi-
nal Prosecution, 4 J. CRIM. DEF. 183, 197 (1978). See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 9, at
196; PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 746-47 (2d ed. 1969). ContraJ. SALMONO,JURISPRUDENCE 280
(I0 .h ed. 1947). Since a defendant should know from the purchase of a large amount of
narcotics that a conspiracy will be furthered, that knowledge could then lead to an infer-
ence that he intended that result.
107. United States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330, 1337 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840
(1979).
108. Dickey, 736 F.2d at 582 (citing Heath, 580 F.2d at 1022).
109. See supra note 106.
110. Goldstein, supra note 92, at 147-48.
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As Judge McKay suggested, the approach taken by the majority in
Dickey was undisciplined."I  The mechanical application of the chain
conspiracy model was inappropriate. Even the summary of facts set
forth in the Tenth Circuit's opinion shows that participants performed
various functions at various times in various combinations with other
participants.' 12 This elaborate set of facts does not lend itself to a sim-
ple structural characterization. Regardless of the quantity and quality of
evidence against each defendant, the courts should more carefully ex-
amine each defendant's connection to the conspiracy. Automatic char-
acterization of transactions as single rather than multiple conspiracies
endangers the right of defendants to an individual determination of
guilt. 113
E. The Slight Evidence Rule.- An Inadequate Standard
The "slight evidence rule," as originally formulated, is a standard of
appellate review used to examine the sufficiency of evidence required to
uphold a jury's verdict connecting a defendant to a conspiracy. 114 This
rule is the accepted standard in most circuits but it is expressed and
applied in a variety of ways.' 15 The Tenth Circuit's version, applied in
both Dickey and Pilling, reads: "In conspiracy cases, . . . the record need
only show 'slight evidence of a particular defendant's connection with a
conspiracy that has already been established through independent
evidence.' "1 16
There are several problems with this rule. First, the rule has been
111. 736F.2dat601.
112. Id. at 578-81.
113. See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946).
114. The rule first appeared in Tomplain v. United States, 42 F.2d 202, 203 (5th Cir.
1930) ("The conspiracy was conclusively established, and but slight evidence connecting
the defendants was necessary."), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 886 (1930).
115. United States v. Smith, 726 F.2d 852, 866 (1st Cir. 1984) ("Once the existence of
a conspiracy has been established, even slight evidence implicating a defendant may be
sufficient proof of his involvement."); United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 988 (7th Cir.)
("Once a conspiracy is shown to exist evidence that establishes a particular defendant's
participation beyond a reasonable doubt, although the connection between defendant and
conspiracy is slight, is sufficient to convict."), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 486 (1983); United
States v. Smith, 561 F.2d 8, 12 (6th Cir.) ("Once the existence of a conspiracy has been
established, only slight additional evidence is required to connect a particular defendant
with it."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 958, 972, 1019, 1048 (1977). United States v. Dunn, 564
F.2d 348, 357 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Once the existence of a conspiracy is established, evidence
establishing beyond a reasonable doubt a connection of a defendant with a conspiracy,
even though the connection is slight, is sufficient to convict him of knowing participation
in the conspiracy."), followed in United States v. Laughman, 618 F.2d 1067, 1076 (4th Cir.
1980); United States v. Overshon, 494 F.2d 894, 896 (8th Cir.) ("Once the government
has established the existence of a conspiracy, even slight evidence connecting a particular
defendant to the conspiracy may be substantial and therefore sufficient proof of the de-
fendant's involvement in the scheme."), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 853, 878 (1974). The Second
Circuit has a completely different test. See United States v. Provenzano, 615 F.2d 37, 45
(2d Cir.) (requiring "active participation with intent to further the objectives of the con-
spiracy"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 953 (1980).
116. Dickey, 736 F.2d at 583 (quoting United States v. Peterson, 611 F.2d 1313, 1317
(10th Cir. 1979)); see Pilling, 721 F.2d at 293 (quoting United States v. Andrews, 585 F.2d
961, 964 (10th Cir. 1978)).
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applied by some circuits in such a way that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt may no longer be needed to connect a defendant to a conspiracy,
despite bromides to the contrary. 1 7 When properly applied, the word
"slight" should be used to modify "connection" and not "evidence."" 8
Some circuits, however, have used the test to require only slight evi-
dence, sometimes with the rationale that the essence of the proof re-
quirement goes to the establishment of the conspiracy and not to the
connection of a defendant to the conspiracy." 9 Therefore, if an appel-
late court finds only slight evidence in the record to connect a defendant
to a conspiracy, it need not determine if the evidence is sufficient to
support a jury finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
120
The slight evidence standard reduces the level of scrutiny given by
appellate courts to jury verdicts below the standard normally required in
criminal cases. Evidence of a defendant's connection to a conspiracy
will not be examined in any detail and the court is much more likely to
defer to ajury's findings when this standard is mechanically applied.' 2 '
Furthermore, it is highly doubtful that slight evidence can ever support a
jury finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Recognizing this prob-
lem, the Fifth Circuit (with whom the rule originated) now requires
"substantial" evidence of a defendant's connection with a conspiracy.122
A second, less serious problem arises even when the rule is charac-
terized as requiring "substantial" evidence of a "slight" connection.
2 3
A defendant may be convicted by evidence that he had any contact, how-
ever slight that contact might be, with the conspiracy. This difficulty is
partially alleviated by requiring, as the Tenth Circuit does, that the de-
fendant have knowledge of the conspiracy's general scope. 124 However,
since knowledge is usually proved by inference, even this formulation of
the slight evidence rule can serve to sweep a defendant into the overex-
tended "fishnet" of a single conspiracy.
125
Third, the rule has begun to find its way into the jury room. Confu-
sion over the origin and proper formulation of the rule has led to its
inclusion in some jury instructions. 126 This practice is condemned by
most circuits, but the Ninth Circuit approved the practice in United States
117. See, e.g., Pilling at 292. The Tenth Circuit used the defendants' lack of business
records to infer their connection with the conspiracy. This seems to reverse the traditional
burden of proof, forcing defendants to prove their innocence.
118. Dunn, 564 F.2d at 357. (The word "slight" "is tied to that which is proved, not the
type of evidence or the burden of proof.")
119. United States v. Schmaltz, 562 F.2d 558, 560 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 957
(1977).
120. Note, 68 VA. L. REv., supra note 3, at 888.
121. Id.
122. United States v. Malatesta, 590 F.2d 1379, 1382 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 962 (1979). This test was adopted recently by the Eleventh Circuit in United
States v. Bulman, 667 F.2d 1374 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1010 (1982).
123. See, e.g., Dunn, 564 F.2d at 357; Xheka, 704 F.2d at 988.
124. Dickey, 736 F.2d at 583 (citing Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557
(1947)).
125. See United States v. Heath, 580 F.2d 1011, 1026 (10th Cir.) (McKay, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 105 (1978).
126. Note, 68 VA. L. REv., supra note 3, at 895 & n.73.
1984]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LI W REVIEW
v. Lustig.12 7 It is possible that juries will, in some cases, let insubstantial
evidence connect an individual to a conspiracy. 128 The requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is replaced by guilt by association.
No formulation of this rule can bejustified. As is true with much of
the body of conspiracy law, confusion, inadequate appellate review, and
guilt by association are all possible outcomes of any application of the
slight evidence rule. Regardless of the evidence against the combined
defendants in Dickey and Pilling, the individual defendants in each case
deserved close scrutiny of the evidence relating to their individual
guilt.129 The Tenth Circuit should discard the slight evidence rule and
replace it with a substantial evidence test. The evidence must be able to
support, beyond a reasonable doubt, a finding that each defendant
agreed to join the conspiracy. Mere knowledge of the general scope of
the conspiracy is no substitute for proof of an agreement.
F. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit's holdings in Dickey and Pilling perpetuate the
mechanical application of inadequate methods of review in criminal con-
spiracy cases.13 0 The danger of guilt by association will continue to ex-
ist unless these methods are abandoned and replaced by a conscientious
and disciplined approach that speaks to the nature of the crime of con-
spiracy-the agreement. Structural models, the common objective test,
and the slight evidence rule all cloud and confuse any attempt to find the
existence of an agreement.
Prosecutors should not be allowed to ensnare multiple defendants
with the net of the single conspiracy without showing defendants' actual
knowledge of the existence of others in the conspiracy and proving that
each individual defendant intended to join the conspiracy. The current
tests and standards employed by the Tenth Circuit permit too may pre-
sumptions and inferences; it is impossible to predict what additional in-
ferences a jury will make when a defendant stands trial next to a host of
conspirators.
127. 555 F.2d 737, 750 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 926, 1045 (1978).
128. See United States v. Dixon, 562 F.2d 1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 1977) (Goodwin, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 927 (1978). See also Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S.
440 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); United States v. Toliver, 541 F.2d 958, 962-63 (2d
Cir. 1976). A jury may have difficulty distinguishing defendants, remembering each de-
fendant's role in the conspiracy, and determining what evidence applies to each defendant.
See, e.g., United States v. Central Supply Ass'n, 6 F.R.D. 526, 528, 533-35 (N.D. Ohio 1947)
(76 defendants tried, 1616 exhibits in evidence).
129. "The need for safeguarding defendants from misunderstanding by the jury is pe-
culiarly acute in conspiracy trials .... " United States v. Liss, 137 F.2d 995, 1003 (2d Cir.
1943) (FrankJ, dissenting in part), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 773 (1943). Conspiracy proceed-
ings "call for use of every safeguard to individualize each defendant in his relation to the
mass." Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 753 (1946).
130. United States v. Hines, 728 F.2d 421 (10th Cir.) (conspiracy to burglarize a post
office), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3523 (1984); United States v. Holt, Nos. 81-1813, 81-1814,
slip op. (10th Cir. Aug. 22, 1983) (conspiracy to receive, barter, sell, and dispose of an
automobile); See also Fitzgerald v. United States, 719 F.2d 1069 (10th Cir. 1983) (posses-
sion of controlled substances with intent to distribute).
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Although some argue that conspiracy is an unnecessary part of
criminal law, 13 1 the rationales behind the criminalization of conspir-
acy' 3 2 are substantial enough to justify its use, provided that individuals
are allowed every appropriate procedural safeguard to assure an individ-
ual determination of guilt.
II. MAIL FRAUD
The federal mail fraud statute' 3 3 has been characterized as the
"first line of defense" against fraud.13 4 Because new types of fraud are
developed faster than Congress can counteract them, the courts and
Congress have treated the mail fraud statute as a stopgap measure to
combat frauds before Congress acts to address them specifically.' 3 5 Fre-
quently, the mail fraud statute is the only means by which a defrauder
can be brought to justice. In recognition of this, Congress has steadily
expanded the scope of the statute and the federal courts have read it
liberally to apply it to virtually any scheme to defraud.1
3 6
Fraudulent schemes have been divided into two general classes:
those which are intended to defraud individuals of money or other tan-
gible property, and those which operate to deprive citizens of certain
"intangible rights or interests."' 3 7 The term "fraud" also has been held
to encompass activities which are contrary to notions of "moral up-
rightness . . . fundamental honesty, [and] fair play."' 3 8
131. See, e.g.,Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1137 (1973)
(arguing that conspiracy adds only confusion to the law).
132. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
133. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). It provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses, representations, or promises . . . for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized
depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered
by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or
knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon...
any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
134. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
135. See Morano, The Mail Fraud Statute: A Procrustean Bed, 14J. MAR. L. REv. 45, 47-48
(1980).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) has been revised five times since its enactment in 1872.
See Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18 DUg. L. REV. 771, 772 (1980). See also
United States v. Boyd, 606 F.2d 792, 794 (8th Cir. 1979) (the statute should be read ex-
pansively to effectuate its purpose of punishing any scheme to defraud in which the mails
are used).
137. Morano, supra note 135, at 48. The courts have interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 1341 as
allowing prosecution of these two classes of fraud by treating the statutory language
"scheme ... to defraud, or for obtaining money or property" as mutually exclusive dis-
juncts. United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 763-64 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
909 (1974). In recent years the "intangible rights" theory has been applied broadly to
allow increased use of the mail fraud statute as a tool to combat local corruption. This
effort has met with opposition among legal writers. See, e.g., Comment, Federal Criminal
Jurisdiction: a Case Against Mahing Federal Cases, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 574 (1984); Com-
ment, The Intangible-Rights Doctrine and Political Corruption Prosecutions Under the Federal Mail
Fraud Statute, 47 U. Cm. L. REV. 562 (1980).
138. Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958). See also Badders v.
United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393 (1916) ("Whatever the limits to [Congress's] power, it
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The elements of the offense of mail fraud "are (1) a scheme to de-
fraud, and (2) the mailing of a letter, etc., for the purpose of executing
the scheme." 139 It is the second element of the offense, use of the mails,
which converts what would, in most cases, be a state crime into a federal
offense. 140
The original purpose of the mail fraud statute was to protect "the
public against all . . .intentional efforts to despoil, and to prevent the
post office from being used to carry [fraudulent schemes] into ef-
fect."' 4 1 It has been argued that the legislative history of the act indi-
cates that it was meant to reach frauds in which the use of the mails was
an indispensible method for carrying out the scheme.142 However, ex-
pansive interpretation by the federal courts now only requires that the
mailing be "sufficiently closely related"' 14 3 to the scheme or incidental
to an essential part of the scheme to trigger the jurisdiction of the mail
fraud statute.14 4 It is not necessary that a party actually contemplate use
of the mails or even that he do the mailing, as long as the defrauder
"causes" the mailing to be done and acts with the "knowledge that the
use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where
such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually
intended."1
4 5
The Tenth Circuit recently dealt with both of the general types of
fraudulent schemes. In United States v. Primrose,146 the scheme involved a
violation of the public's right to honest government, an excellent exam-
ple of using 18 U.S.C. § 1341 to combat local political corruption. 14 7 In
United States v. Glick, ' 48 the scheme was designed to deprive persons of
money.
A. Sufficiency of the Mailing: United States v. Primrose
Primrose'49 was an unsuccessful appeal by the County Commissioner
may forbid any such acts done in furtherance of a scheme that it regards as contrary to
public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not.").
139. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954); United States v. Wolf, 561 F.2d
1376, 1379 (10th Cir. 1977).
140. Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 385 (1960). It has been argued that this sec-
ond element is not purely jurisdictional in that it requires something akin to proximate
cause ("sufficiently closely related") and foreseeability ("reasonable foreseeable"). See
Rakoff, supra note 136, at 775-76 (citing United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 399, 405
(1974) and Pereira, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9). In these respects, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 resembles in some
ways the federal conspiracy statute (18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982)). Rakoff, supra note 136, at
776.
141. Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896).
142. See Comment, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 137, at 580-81.
143. Maze, 414 U.S. at 399.
144. Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8.
145. Id. at 8-9 (citing United States v. Kenofsky, 243 U.S. 440 (1917) (superintendent,
ignorant of defendant's scheme, mailed false death certificate filed by defendant)); see also
United States v. Moss, 591 F.2d 428, 436 (8th Cir. 1979) (mails used by nondefendant to
obtain insurance for target of murder scheme).
146. 718 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1983).
147. See supra note 137.
148. 710 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1983). See infra text accompanying notes 178-220.
149. 718 F.2d 1484 410th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2352 (1984).
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of Murray County, Oklahoma, of a federal district court conviction for
thirteen counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).150
As county commissioner, Primrose was empowered to purchase materi-
als and supplies for the purpose of maintaining the roads and bridges of
the county. 15 Primrose was charged with defrauding the citizens of
Murray County by purchasing the materials and supplies in return for
kickbacks paid by the vendors at the time orders were placed. He was
also charged with placing orders for materials which, by arrangement
with the vendors, were not to be delivered. He then divided the pay-
ment for the undelivered goods with the vendors. The vendors would
later bill the county for the materials by mailed invoices, and receive
warrants, the county's "checks," through the mail.
152
Primrose first argued that because the mailings occurred after the
kickbacks had been paid, the mails were not a part of the scheme to
defraud. In Primrose's view, the scheme had reached fruition and was
fully executed before the mailings were made, rendering the mail fraud
statute inapplicable. '
5 3
The Tenth Circuit, Judge Seymour writing, rejected this defense by
applying the holdings of United States v. Bottom 154 and United States v.
Boyd. 15 5 In those cases the Fifth and Eighth Circuits respectively had
rejected the completed-scheme defense made under circumstances simi-
lar to those in Primrose. Both Bottom and Boyd emphasized that payments
made by mail after receipt of kickbacks were necessarily a part of the
fraudulent scheme because the mailings ensured that the parties making
the kickbacks were paid. 15 6 Without the final payment by mail to the
party issuing the kickback to the defendant, the plan would fail. Each
payment was therefore essential to the success of the overall scheme.
Furthermore, the Bottom court observed that the citizens were not actu-
ally defrauded until Bottom paid for the illegally obtained materials.
15 7
The Tenth Circuit adopted both Bottom and Boyd, and held that the mail-
ing of the invoices and warrants were an essential part of Primrose's
scheme. 1
5 8
The court also considered the effect of the affidavits of noncollusion
mailed with each invoice by the vendor to the county, as required by
local law. Citing United States v. Sampson,' 5 9 the court held that a mailing
150. See supra note 133. Primrose was originally charged with thirty-eight counts of
mail fraud and three counts of extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982). 718 F.2d
at 1485.
151. 718 F.2d at 1486.
152. Id. at 1486-88.
153. Id. at 1489.
154. 638 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1981).
155. 606 F.2d 792 (8th Cir. 1979).
156. Bottom, 638 F.2d at 785-86; Boyd, 606 F.2d at 794. It is immaterial whether the
checks could have been delivered in a way other than by the mails. United States v. Diggs,
613 F.2d 988, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980); United States v. Tal-
bott, 590 F.2d 192, 195 (6th Cir. 1978).
157. 638 F.2d at 785.
158. 718 F.2d at 1491.
159. 371 U.S. 75 (1962).
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made in an effort to convince the victim that no fraud had taken place
could be considered part of the overall plan. 160 The court found that
the affidavits of noncollusion "helped to conceal Primrose's kickback
scheme" and were therefore part of that scheme. 16 1 The court did not
address the issue of whether Primrose "caused" these particular mail-
ings to be made within the meaning of section 1341. Because Primrose,
however, was certainly aware that the mails would be used in the normal
course of business to forward the checks, invoices and noncollusion
agreements, there can be no real question that he "caused" the mailings
under current judicial doctrine.1
62
Primrose cited three cases, United States v. Maze,16 3 Kann v. United
States, 16 4 and United States v. Wolf, 165 in support of his defense that mail-
ings done after a fraudulent scheme has reached fruition are not made
"for the purpose of executing" the fraud, within the meaning of the mail
fraud statute.' 6 6 Maze involved the fraudulent use of a stolen credit card
at various motels. The Supreme Court ruled that the motels' mailings of
the credit card sales slips to the bank which issued the card were not
sufficiently closely related to the scheme to bring the defrauder's con-
duct within the mail fraud statute.16 7 Similarly, in Kann the defendants
had fraudulently obtained checks which they subsequently cashed or de-
posited. The bank then mailed the checks to the banks from which the
funds were to be drawn. The Supreme Court ruled that the fraud was
complete when the defendants cashed the checks. The manner in which
the bank collected from the drawee bank was irrelevant. 168 Wolf in-
volved a scheme in which the defendant, through his corporations, sold
outstanding customer accounts receivable to a financing corporation.
The financing corporation then mailed invoices to the customers re-
questing that they make future payments directly to it. The defendant,
however, continued to accept payment for the sold accounts; in some
cases the accounts sold were entirely fictitious. 169 The Tenth Circuit,
relying on Kann, held that the fraudulent transaction was complete at
the time the accounts were sold and that the subsequent mailings by the
assignee financing corporation were not made in furtherance of the
scheme. '
70
The Tenth Circuit distinguished all of these cases on the basis of
facts.171 Quoting United States v. Knight,172 the court said that the cases
160. 718 F.2d at 1490-91.
161. Id.
162. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
163. 414 U.S. 395 (1974).
164. 323 U.S. 88 (1944).
165. 561 F.2d 1376 (10th Cir. 1977).
166. 718 F.2d at 1491.
167. 414 U.S. at 402-05.
168. 323 U.S. at 94.
169. 561 F.2d at 1378-79.
170. Id. at 1380.
171. 718 F.2d at 1491.
172. 607 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1979). See also United States v. Kent, 608 F.2d 542,
546 (5th Cir. 1979) ("The dependence test is not met if use of the mails is made after the
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cited by Primrose had not ruled that where a fraudulent scheme contin-
ues after the money from the scheme is received by the defrauder, sub-
sequent mailings could never be considered as part of the fraudulent
scheme. Rather, the cases held that the particular schemes involved had
been completed before the mailings in question.
Alternatively, Primrose argued that since he was legally required to
purchase materials and supplies as a part of his job, mailings made pur-
suant to his duty were not criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 1341.173 This
argument rested entirely on the case of Parr v. United States, 174 in which
the Supreme Court held that absent a showing that contents of a mailing
are "excessive, 'padded' or in any way illegal," mailings made as a result
of a legally imposed duty are not actionable under the mail fraud stat-
ute. 175 The Tenth Circuit distinguished Parr by noting that unlike the
parties in Parr, Primrose and the vendors were all willing participants in
the scheme. While Primrose may have had a duty to buy materials and
supplies, he did not have a legal duty to purchase them from vendors
who offered him kickbacks. In fact, under the state's Anti-Kickback Act
of 1974,176 Primrose was legally required not to accept kickbacks.
177
B. "Deliberate Ignorance" of Fraudulent Acts: United States v. Glick
In United States v. Glick, 178 the Tenth Circuit faced the task of deter-
mining whether the use and form of a jury instruction on "deliberate
ignorance" were proper in light of the specific intent requirement of the
federal mail fraud statute. 179 The court held that deliberate ignorance,
rather than positive knowledge, can satisfy the specific intent require-
ment and that the form of the instruction adequately, if imperfectly,
charged the jury on the concept of deliberate ignorance.1
8 0
Glick involved a scheme to defraud would-be financial borrowers
from 1975 to 1976.181 Reginald Chisholm, the instigator of the scheme,
represented himself as a wealthy man who would, for a fee, put together
loans for people seeking financing from various lending institutions. As
part of the deal, Chisholm promised to tell the potential lenders that he
would personally guarantee the loans.' 8 2 As proof of his wealth,
scheme has been fully consumated, but a fraudulent scheme may depend on a mailing
even after the defrauders have received the sought-after money . . . , because 'the use of
the mails after the money is obtained . . may be for the purpose of executing the fraud
. .") (quoting United States v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793, 799 (5th Cir. 1975)).
173. 718 F.2d at 1491.
174. 363 U.S. 370 (1960).
175. Id. at 387, 391.
176. OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 3404 (1981) provides:
Any person who shall knowingly make or receive, either directly or indirectly,
a kickback shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be fined not more
than Ten Thousand Dollars ($ 10,000.00) or double the amount of the financial
gain or be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years, or both.
177. 718 F.2d at 1491 (emphasis added).
178. 710 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 995 (1984).
179. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). See supra note 133.
180. 710 F.2d at 642.
181. Id. at 641.
182. Id.
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Chisholm showed his potential clients financial statements prepared by
Steven Glick, a certified public accountant. The statements included in-
formation about Chisholm's personal finances as well as those of three
corporations which he owned or controlled. 183 Included with these
statements were letters by Glick in which he represented that the state-
ments had been prepared in accord with generally accepted methods,
principles, and standards and that they were accurate representations of
Chisholm's financial status.
184
Both Chisholm and Glick were indicted and Chisholm plead guilty
before trial. 18 5 The major issues at Glick's trial centered around the
value of Chisholm and his corporation's principal asset, mineral rights
to limestone formations on certain national forest lands.' 8 6 Expert wit-
nesses for the government testified that the statements prepared by
Glick greatly overestimated the value of the mineral rights and that Glick
had committed "blatant violations of basic accounting principles."'
' 8 7
Glick testified that four separate appraisals substantially supported his
evaluation. Glick was, however, unable to produce three of these ap-
praisals or give any details as to their contents. A fourth appraisal was
prepared by someone who had interests in Chisholm's businesses.'
8 8
Much of Glick's testimony worked against him. Most important, Glick
stated that he knew that no lender would grant a loan based on the state-
ments, that he knew that Chisholm was collecting fees in return for use
of the statements, and that as early as 1975 he personally believed the
mineral rights evaluations to be unrealistic.' 8 9 But despite this belief,
Glick testified that he thought the mineral rights possessed substantial
value. He also expressed his belief that Chisholm's scheme was legiti-
mate at the time he prepared the financial statements.190
The jury convicted Glick on eight counts of mail fraud in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 134119' and two counts of travel in interstate commerce
to execute a scheme to defraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314.192 On
appeal, Glick raised two issues, only one of which will be addressed in
183. Id.
184. Id. Government experts testified to the contrary. See infra note 187 and accompa-
nying text.
185. 710 F.2d at 641. "Chisholm had previously been convicted in a federal criminal
proceeding in Portland, Oregon, on charges apparently arising from other acts involving
the same fraudulent plan." Id.
186. Id. Chisholm indicated to potential investors that he would mine the limestone or
construct a real estate development on the property above the minerals. A government
expert testified at trial that Chisholm would not have been able to do either. Id.
187. 710 F.2d at 641, 642.
188. Id. at 641. A fifth appraisal was obtained by Chisholm in preparation for his Port-
land trial. That appraisal was admitted into evidence in Glick's trial and stated that com-
mercial mining could be considered given the amount of limestone in the deposits. Id.
189. Id. at 642.
190. Id. at 641-42.
191. See supra note 133.
192. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, transports or causes to be transported, or induces
any person to travel in, or to be transported in interstate commerce in the execu-
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this survey.' 93 Glick claimed that the trial court's instruction on the
doctrine of "deliberate ignorance" was not warranted by the evidence
and that, even if warranted, the form of the instruction permitted the
jury to convict him on "proof of a lesser degree of knowledge than that
required by the statute."' 194 The instructions at issue read in relevant
part:
In order to convict the defendant in this case, you must find
that he acted knowingly.
However, the element of knowledge may be established by
proof that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what
otherwise would have been obvious to him. In other words, the
requirement that the defendant has acted knowingly does not
mean that the defendant needed to have positive knowledge. If
the defendant failed to have positive knowledge only because
he conscientiously avoided acquiring it, the requirement of
knowledge is satisfied.
... . It is not sufficient to merely prove that . . .Glick
prepared fraudulent financial statements. The prosecution
must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Glick
knowingly participated in the scheme or artifice involved in this
case. Thus, if you find that Mr. Glick prepared fraudulent fi-
nancial statements but did not intentionally and knowingly par-
ticipate in the scheme or artifice involved in this case, you must
find him not guilty.
19 5
The Tenth Circuit, Judge Seymour writing, upheld Glick's convic-
tions despite imperfections in the instruction on deliberate igno-
rance.' 96 The court first examined whether the instruction was proper
in light of the fact that the government, prosecuting pursuant to the mail
fraud statute, was required to prove that Glick specifically intended to
defraud. 197 Judge Seymour implicitly agreed with the part of the in-
struction that stated positive knowledge of a fraudulent scheme is not
tion or concealment of a scheme or artifice to defraud that person of money or
property having a value of $5,000 or more; ....
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years,
or both.
Glick was also charged with aiding and abetting the above crimes in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2(a) (1982). 710 F.2d at 640 & n.2.
193. Glick also argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. 710 F.2d at
644-45.
194. Id. at 642.
195. Id. at 643-44 n.4 (quoting Record, vol. VIII, at 672-73). The trial court also in-
structed the jury on the definition of "'knowingly":
An act is done knowingly if done voluntarily and intentionally and not be-
cause of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.
The purpose of adding the word "knowingly" is to ensure that no one would
be convicted for an act done because of mistake, or accident or innocent reason.
Id. at 643 n.4 (quoting Record, vol. VIII, at 670).
196. Id. at 643-44.
197. Id. at 642 (quoting United States v. Martin-Trigona, 684 F.2d 485, 492 (7th Cir.
1982)). Specific fraudulent intent is crucial because it can turn otherwise innocent actions
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required. In the court's view, conscious avoidance of knowledge is
equally as culpable as positive or actual knowledge. The court pointed
out, however, that in order to avoid convictions based on mere negli-
gence, a deliberate ignorance instruction should only be given where the
evidence points to such conduct. 198
The court found no merit in Glick's argument that the evidence at
trial did not justify the instruction. Several facts, taken together, could
have led a reasonable juror to conclude that Glick was aware of facts
which indicated that Chisholm was involved in a fraudulent scheme, but
that he nevertheless chose to remain ignorant concerning the propriety of
the venture. 19 9 These facts included Glick's knowledge that Chisholm
was collecting fees for financial statements which Glick knew to be inad-
equate to obtain a loan, as well as his personal belief that Chisholm's
mineral rights were overvalued. Furthermore, Glick had repeatedly vio-
lated basic accounting and auditing principles in the preparation of the
financial statements. 20 0 The court found that a reasonable juror could
conclude that Glick either knew of the fraudulent purpose of Chisholm's
scheme or deliberately avoided gaining such knowledge.
2 0 '
Glick also argued that the instruction was fatally incomplete be-
cause it did not require the jury to find that "the defendant was subjec-
tively aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact whose
knowledge is imputed, and that knowledge of that fact may not be im-
puted if the defendant actually believed that such fact did not exist."
20 2
As the court noted, this instruction is designed to assure that a defend-
ant's ignorance is deliberate or willful. If a defendant is merely negli-
gent or has only made a mistake, then the required knowledge cannot be
imputed. 20 3 The court admitted that this added language would have
resulted in a better instruction, but found that its exclusion did not con-
stitute plain error.20 4 Examining the instruction given, the court found
that it contained sufficient language concerning deliberate and inten-
tional ignorance of facts which would have been obvious to Glick had he
into an actionable crime. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916). See aLso supra
note 139 and accompanying text.
198. 710 F.2d at 642. See also infra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
199. 710 F.2d at 642.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 642-43 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 17). Such language is similar to that
adopted by the Tenth Circuit from the Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Jewell, 532
F.2d 697, 704 n.21 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976). The preferable
instruction would require, in addition to the instruction given to the jury in Glick: "(1) that
the required knowledge is established if the accused is aware of a high probability of the
existence of the fact in question, (2) unless he actually believes it does not exist." 532 F.2d
at 704 n.21. See also infra note 212 and accompanying text.
203. 710 F.2d at 642 (quoting Griego v. United States, 298 F.2d 845, 849 (10th Cir.
1962)).
204. 710 F.2d at 643-44. Glick was required to show that the omission constituted
plain error because defense counsel was given several opportunities to alter the language
at trial (the trial judge even offered to use the quote fromJewell) but did not do so. There-
fore, FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) permits the appellate court to reverse only if failure to include
the added language was plain error. Id.
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not closed his eyes to them.20 5
The jury instruction on deliberate ignorance given in Glick was im-
portant because it concerned the statutory requirement of specific intent
under the mail fraud statute. 20 6 Specific intent to defraud can some-
times be shown by direct evidence. This is possible where a party ac-
tively misrepresents material facts to his victims, as Chisholm did in the
Glick case. However, circumstantial evidence is usually required to
prove intent. Actions of a defendant may permit the inference that he
was involved in a scheme which he knew, or should have known, was
fraudulent.
20 7
Frequently, a relatively minor actor will take steps to remain igno-
rant of facts which he suspects will show his complicity in a fraudulent
scheme, with the hope that ignorance will excuse his conduct. For this
reason the federal courts have accepted deliberate ignorance, willful
blindness, or conscious avoidance as a substitute for positive or actual
knowledge. 20 8 The courts have long recognized that deliberate igno-
rance is equally as culpable as positive knowledge. 20 9 Therefore, one
who consciously avoids obtaining knowledge which a reasonable man
exercising due diligence would discover "has sufficient mens rea for an
offence based on such words as . . . 'knowingly'."
2 10
The federal circuit courts have adopted several different formula-
tions of the deliberate ignorance instruction. Unlike rules of law in
other statutory contexts, these different formulations are substantially
similar and reflect a high degree of concern for consistency among the
circuits.2 1 1 The courts agree that a proper jury instruction has three
205. Id. at 643-44.
206. See Note, A Survey of the Mail Fraud Act, 8 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 673, 677-78 (1978).
See also Note, White-Collar Crime: A Survey of Law-Mail Fraud and Wire Fraud, 18 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 197, 200 (1980). The government must also show that the mails were used to
further the fraudulent scheme. See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954); United
States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States v. Azzarelli Constr. Co.,
612 F.2d 292, 298 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Beecroft, 608 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir.
1979). See also supra note 139 and accompanying text.
207. See Note, 8 MEM. ST. U.L. REV., supra note 76, at 678. See also Note, Survey of the
Law of Mail Fraud, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 237, 242.
208. The term for conduct showing deliberate ignorance varies among the federal cir-
cuits because of repeated attempts to clarify the concept. See infra note 211.
209. United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 700. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw, 776 (2d
ed. 1969); G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART, § 57 at 157 (2d ed. 1961). See
also Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1940) ("Ignorance of inculpatory fact is
no more a defense than ignorance of inculpatory law. There is evidence that each of the
appellants knew, or could have known by the exercise of reasonable diligence, that the
statements made to prospective purchasers concerning the value of the stocks of the re-
spective corporations were false.").
210. Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of Knowledge, 17 MoD. L. REv. 294, 298 (1954)
(quoted inJewell, 532 F.2d at 700).
211. See, e.g., United States v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632, 642 (1st Cir.) (deliberately
closing eyes to the obvious; refusal to be enlighted and take notice; "willful blindness to
the existence of the fact"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980); United States v. Aulet, 618
F.2d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 1980) (purposeful ignorance of evidence); United States v. Eaglin,
571 F.2d 1069, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 1977) (suspicion aroused but defendant deliberately
failed to make further inquiries so as to remain in ignorance; closing eyes to facts which
should prompt investigation), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906 (1978); Griego v. United States,
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characteristics: 1) it must refer to purposeful avoidance of the knowl-
edge of a material fact or facts; 2) the defendant must have been aware
of a high probability that the fact exists; and 3) deliberate ignorance can
not be found if the defendant had an actual belief that the fact did not
exist.2 12 The Tenth Circuit, as Glick demonstrates, follows this con-
struction of the doctrine of deliberate ignorance. As stated in Glick,
however, failure to include the final two elements is not plain error
where the jury is properly instructed on conscious avoidance.
2 13
Use of a deliberate ignorance instruction is strictly limited by the
courts. The instruction may only be given when there is evidence that
points toward deliberate action with the purpose of remaining in the
dark.2 14 This restriction is necessary to ensure that a jury will not im-
pute specific intent based merely on negligence.
2 15
Certainly in Glick's case there seemed to be evidence which pointed
toward deliberate ignorance. By testifying that four appraisals substan-
tiated the stated value of Chisholm's mineral rights (as included in the
financial statements), Glick seemed to implicitly claim that he had an
actual belief that that value was legitimate.2 1 6 However, his own testi-
mony that he personally thought the value to be overstated 2 17 effectively
defeated that contention. Furthermore, despite Glick's belief and
knowledge of how Chisholm was using the financial statements, Glick
included the "unrealistic" value in the statements. 21 8 Apart from this
fact, the statements contained blatant and numerous violations of
proper accounting procedures.2 19 The Tenth Circuit was undoubtedly
correct in upholding the trial court's instruction. The evidence, taken as
a whole, pointed to deliberate ignorance. Glick purposefully attempted
to avoid culpability by closing his eyes to facts which a reasonable man
would discover after exercising due diligence. In short, Glick tried to




In United States v. Montoya,221 the defendant had contracted, through
his corporation, with the State of New Mexico to weatherize the homes
298 F.2d 845, 849 (10th Cir. 1962) ("willfully and intentionally remaining ignorant of a
fact"; "conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment").
212. Autet, 618 F.2d at 191.
213. 710 F.2d at 643-44. See also Eaglin, 571 F.2d at 1074-75.
214. United States v. Garzon, 688 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632,642-43 (1 st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980); United States
v. Murrieta-Bejarano, 552 F.2d 1323, 1325 (9th Cir. 1977).
215. Garzon, 688 F.2d at 609.
216. If a defendant has an actual belief that a fraudulent fact does not exist, knowledge
of that fact may not be imputed. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 704 n.2 1. See also supra note 202 and
accompanying text.
217. 710 F.2d at 642.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
221. 716 F.2d 1340 (10th Cir. 1983).
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of elderly, low income New Mexico citizens.2 22 The weatherization pro-
ject was funded by a lump sum grant from the United States Department
of Energy. 2 23 Montoya submitted claims to the Governor's Office of
Community Affairs, the administrator of the program, for work which he
had not done. 224 The United States then indicted Montoya on six
counts of submitting false claims to the federal government in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1976).225
Before trial, Montoya moved the district court to dismiss the case
for lack of federal jurisdiction, arguing that because his claims were
presented to a state agency receiving no apparent supervision from the
federal government his conduct did not violate federal law. The district
court denied the motion and convicted Montoya on all counts.
2 26
On appeal, Montoya again raised the claim that because he con-
tracted with and was paid by a state agency he could not have presented
false claims to the United States government. 2 27 The Tenth Circuit af-
firmed the convictions and held that it is not necessary that a false claim
be presented directly to the United States or one of its agencies or de-
partments in order to be actionable under the criminal version of the
False Claims Act.
2 28
The court first established that claims presented to an intermediary
could be actionable under section 287 if the payment ultimately comes
from the United States. 22 9 The court reached this holding from an ex-
amination of the analysis in both United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess 2 30 and
United States v. Catena.2 3 ' Hess involved a violation of the precursor of 18
U.S.C. § 287 (section 5438 of the Revised Statutes 23 2 ) in which Hess
made false claims to a municipality with which he had contracted to do
public works projects funded largely by the United States Public Works
Administration. 23 3 The Supreme Court held that section 5438 did not
222. Id. at 1341.
223. The funds were granted pursuant to the Energy Conservation in Existing Build-
ings Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6851-73 (1982).
224. 716 F.2d at 1341.
225. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever makes or presents to . . . the United States, or to any department
or agency thereof, any claim upon or against the United States, or any depart-
ment or agency thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent,
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
226. 716 F.2d at 1341. "Montoya was sentenced to five years on each count, the
sentences to run concurrently." Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1341-44. Judge Timbers of the Second Circuit sat by designation and wrote
the opinion of the court.
229. Id. at 1342-43.
230. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
231. 500 F.2d 1319 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1047 (1974).
232. Section 5438 provided in pertinent part:
Every person who makes or causes to be made, or presents or causes to be presented,
for payment or approval to . . . the United States, any claim upon or against the
Government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, knowing
such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent . . . [shall be punished].
Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (emphasis added).
233. 317 U.S. at 542-43.
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require that the false claim be presented directly to the federal govern-
ment as long as federal funds would ultimately be used to pay the
claims.
23 4
The Tenth Circuit then rejected the potentially troublesome argu-
ment that section 5438 should be distinguished from 18 U.S.C.
§ 287.235 The two statutes differ in that section 5438 contained lan-
guage that expressly prohibited a defendant from causing claims to be
presented to the United States government. The court relied on Catena,
where the Third Circuit rejected the distinction. 23 6 In Catena, the Third
Circuit held that the "causes" language of section 5438 was replaced by
18 U.S.C. § 2(b), which provides that "[w]hoever willfully causes an act
to be done, which if directly performed by him or another would be an
offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.''237
Therefore, by reading sections 287 and 2(b) together the Tenth Circuit
agreed with the Third Circuit that section 287 prohibits causing, directly
or indirectly, a false claim to be presented to the federal government.
23 8
Montoya also argued that federal involvement in a program should
have to be substantial, if not direct.23 9 Because the Department of En-
ergy exercised only minimal day to day control over the program after it
granted the funds to New Mexico, Montoya claimed that the state and
not the federal government truly controlled the money.240 The court
noted that the Department of Energy was the source of the funds,
promulgated regulations for the states to follow, was required to moni-
tor each program, and received audits from the state agencies. 24 1 The
court held that the source of the funds and the nature of the program
are critical rather than the timing of the federal payment. 24 2 The court
pointed out that the federal government would have more interest in
preventing false claims where funds are spent on a particular project
than in preventing claims where funds are spent "pursuant to a compre-
hensive federal program or project."-
2 43
As a final challenge, Montoya asserted that absent day-to-day fed-
eral control, a defendant must have knowledge of the federal involve-
ment. 24 4 The court held that this knowledge is irrelevant by analogizing
section 287 to cases interpreting the False Statements Act.2 4 5 Those
cases hold that knowledge of federal involvement is irrelevant and
234. Id. at 543-45.
235. 716 F.2d at 1342-43.
236. 500 F.2d at 1322-23.
237. 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1982). The failure of the indictment to charge Montoya with
violation of § 2(b) was not fatal because the indictment provided sufficient notice of the
criminal violation charged. 716 F.2d at 1343 & n.1. See also Catena, 500 F.2d at 1323 & n.7;
United States v. Koptik, 300 F.2d 19, 22 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 957 (1962).
238. 716 F.2d at 1343.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 6866-68 (1982)).
242. Id. at 1344.
243. Id. at 1344 n.2.
244. Id. at 1344.
245. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
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would give the False Statements Act a narrow and unintended construc-
tion.2 46 Knowledge of federal involvement is not required to form a
mens rea under section 1001 and should not be required under section
287.247
In Montoya, the Tenth Circuit held for the first time that a person
may be convicted under the federal False Claims Act even if he submits
his claims to a state or local intermediary. The focus is on the source of
the money and the nature of the program rather than whether the funds
flow directly from the United States Treasury to the accused. The new
test is sound in that it best serves section 287's purpose of protecting
federal funds from false, fraudulent or fictitious claims. 2 48 Accepting
Montoya's claims would divert the focus of a rule away from this pur-
pose. Just because the federal government has entrusted state and local
governments with the administration of many federal programs, it does
not follow that the federal government has any less interest in punishing
the fraudulent use of those funds.
24 9
A rule that would focus on the technical and day to day control of a
federally funded program would result in a quagmire of factual disputes
and judicial inconsistency. As the Supreme Court aptly stated in Hess,
"funds [given to the states in the form of grants in aid] are as much in
need of protection from fraudulent claims as any other federal money,
and the statute does not make the extent of their safeguard dependent
upon the bookkeeping devices used for their distribution. ' 250 While the
rule enunciated by the Tenth Circuit may broaden the power of the fed-
eral government to prosecute persons under 18 U.S.C. § 287, it should
serve to protect the integrity of federal funds and programs.
IV. EXTORTION-EXPANDING JURISDICTION UNDER
THE HOBBS ACT
2 5 1
In United States v. Boston,2 52 a case of first impression in the Tenth
Circuit, 2 53 the Tenth Circuit assessed the degree of impact a robbery or
extortion scheme must have on interstate commerce to sustain federal
246. 716 F.2d at 1344 (citing United States v. Baker, 626 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 983 (1979)).
247. 716 F.2d at 1345. The mens rea derives from the intent to present a fraudulent
claim. Id. See also 716 F.2d at 1345 n.3 suggesting that Montoya had at least constructive
knowledge of the federal involvement.
248. Note, False Claims, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371 (1981).
249. See Hess, 317 U.S. at 544 ("Government money is as truly expended whether by
checks drawn directly on the Treasury to the ultimate recipient or by grants in aid to
states.").
250. Id. (citation omitted).
251. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982). The Hobbs Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or
attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation
of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
twenty years, or both.
252. 718 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2352 (1984).
253. Id. at 1516.
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jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act.2 54  Defendant Boston was an
Oklahoma County Commissioner charged with taking "kickbacks" from
sellers of equipment and supplies. 25 5 The Tenth Circuit sustained his
conviction under a "depletion of assets" theory, holding that the kick-
backs depleted both the sellers' assets and the county's assets, and that
the depletion of assets affected interstate commerce because the sellers
and the county both were engaged in interstate commerce. 2 56 The
court sustained the conviction even though the indictment did not spe-




The Hobbs Act prohibits interfering with interstate commerce by
way of extortion or robbery. Originally, the Hobbs Act was enacted to
combat labor-related racketeering. 2 58 In United States v. Culbert,259 how-
ever, the Supreme Court held that all criminal conduct, racketeering or
otherwise, within the reach of the statutory language is criminal under
the Act.2 60 In recent years the Hobbs Act has become the primary fed-
eral tool for fighting local political corruption.
Extortion is "the obtaining of property from another, with his con-
sent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear, or under color of official right."'2 6 1 The courts have read this pro-
vision disjunctively so that extortion "under color of official right" need
not be by force, violence, or fear. 2 6 2 Furthermore, a public official need
not induce an extortionate payment, as long as "the motivation for the
payment focuses on the recipient's office."' 26 3 As long as the public offi-
cial wrongfully takes money not due him or his office he is guilty of ex-
tortion within the meaning of the Hobbs Act.
26 4
254. Id. at 1516-17. The federal government obtains jurisdiction through the com-
merce clause: "The Congress shall have Power to ... regulate commerce. . . among the
several States." U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8.
255. 718 F.2d at 1513.
256. Id. at 1516.
257. Id. at 1514-16.
258. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the Making of Law Enforce-
ment Polio,, 65 GEo. L.J. 1171, 1174-75 (1977).
259. 435 U.S. 371 (1978).
260. Id. at 380. See also Ewing, Combating Official Corruption by All Available Means, 10
MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 423, 446-47 (1980).
261. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1982).
262. United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1229 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914
(1972). See also United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 424 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1043 (1980); United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 917 (1979); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 372 (8th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313, 321 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976); United States v.
Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386 (1st Cir.), cert. denied; 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
263. United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1195 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 965 (1981); see United States v. Butler, 618 F.2d 411, 417-19 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 927 (1980). Originally the courts required a showing that the public official had
threatened the subject of the extortion by coercion or duress. See, e.g., United States v.
Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 832-33 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058 (1972).
264. Kenny, 462 F.2d at 1229.
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The second element of the offense, interference with interstate
commerce, gives the federal government jurisdiction over the extortion-
ate act. While the legislative history of the Hobbs Act seems to have
contemplated a direct and substantial effect on interstate commerce,
26 5
courts have interpreted the Act as requiring only a minimal effect.
26 6
Several circuits have held that any de minimis effect is sufficient to sustain
federal jurisdiction.2 6 7 Furthermore, the effect need only be probable
or potential; it does not have to be direct or clearly demonstrated.
26 8
Frequently, the government will attempt to show the requisite interfer-
ence by proof that the victim's assets were depleted as a result of the
extortion, thus reducing the purchasing power of the victim to further
obtain goods which have moved in interstate commerce. It is this "de-
pletion of assets" theory which was at issue in Boston.
B. United States v. Boston
The defendant, William Boston, was County Commissioner of Ma-
jor County, Oklahoma. In his role as County Commissioner, Boston
was obligated to purchase equipment and supplies for maintaining the
county's infrastructure. Boston was charged with accepting and solicit-
ing kickbacks from suppliers in return for purchasing equipment and
materials from those suppliers. The indictment charged seven counts of
extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951,269 and fifty
counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341270 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2.271
At trial, seven suppliers testified that Boston had accepted, and in
some cases solicited, kickbacks. The kickbacks were paid in cash at pri-
vate meetings which occurred after Boston had mailed County checks to
the suppliers in payment for the materials purchased. Boston offered
the testimony of several suppliers who stated that Boston had never
asked for or received kickbacks from them. He also took the stand and
265. See Note, Prosecution Under the Hobbs Act and the Expansion of Federal Criminal Jurisdic-
tion, 66J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 306, 307-11 (1975).
266. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960). See also Note, Extortion, 19
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 396, 402-03 (1981).
267. United States v. Richardson, 596 F.2d 157, 160 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Phillips, 577 F.2d 495, 501 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978); United States
v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 642-43 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975); see United
States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 373 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d
386, 396-97 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d
53, 59 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975).
268. United States v. Rindone, 631 F.2d 491, 494 (7th Cir. 1980) ("realistic
probability" that interstate commerce would have been affected if threat to victim's busi-
ness had been carried out); United States v. Phillips, 577 F.2d 495 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 831 (1978); United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299, 301-02 (6th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978); United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 59-60 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975). The Boston trial judge instructed the jury that the government
was required to prove that Boston "actually or potentially obstructed, delayed, or affected
interstate commerce or attempted to do so." 718 F.2d at 1516 (citing Record at 264).
269. See supra note 251; 718 F.2d at 1513.
270. The statute prohibits using the Postal Service in counterfeiting or fraudulent
schemes. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
271. Section 2 prohibits offenses against the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
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testified that he had never accepted any kickbacks. Nevertheless, the
jury convicted Boston on all counts of violating the Hobbs Act and on
forty-seven of the fifty counts of mail fraud. 2 72
On appeal, Boston argued that the jury should not have been in-
structed on the "depletion of assets" theory and that the evidence
presented at trial did not establish that his actions had a sufficient effect
on interstate commerce as required by the Hobbs Act. 2 73 The Tenth
Circuit, Judge Holloway writing, affirmed the convictions, holding that
evidence of the depletion of the assets of a company involved in inter-
state commerce is sufficient to establish an interference with interstate
commerce. 2 74 The court also held that an indictment charging a viola-
tion of the Hobbs Act need not allege the exact nature of the effect on
interstate commerce so long as the indictment notifies the defendant of
the acts for which he is charged.
27 5
Boston first argued that the jury instruction given at trial on the
depletion of assets theory amounted to a broadening of the charges
against him in violation of his fifth amendment right to have a conviction
based solely on the charges included in the indictment. 2 76 In effect,
Boston argued that the indictment charged one type of interference,
while the depletion of assets constitutes another type. Boston relied on
the case of Stirone v. United States,2 77 in which the Supreme Court re-
versed a conviction under the Hobbs Act because the jury was instructed
that it could convict Stirone if it found the specific effect on interstate
commerce charged in the indictment, or if it found another specific ef-
fect which the government had introduced at trial.
2 78
The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument citing language from
Stirone. In Stirone, the Supreme Court stated that a conviction could rest
on any sufficient effect on interstate commerce shown at trial if the in-
dictment charges the effect in general terms. 2 79 The indictment in Bos-
ton charged that Boston had knowingly and willfully attempted "to
obstruct, delay or effect (sic) commerce and the movement of articles
and commodities in commerce, as the term is defined in [the Hobbs Act]
by extortion." 28 0 Because this charge was general in nature, the deple-
tion of assets theory fell within its bounds. 2 8 1
Boston also challenged the depletion of assets theory on the basis
272. 718 F.2d at 1513-14.
273. Id. at 1514, 1516.
274. Id. at 1516. The court also rejected Boston's challenge of the trial court's voir
dire examination and his argument that the use of the mails was not sufficient to bring the
scheme within the federal mail fraud statute. Id. at 1517-18. The court reversed his con-
viction on two of the mail fraud courts for insufficient evidence and because, in one case,
the mails were not used.
275. Id. at 1515-16.
276. Id. at 1514-15. Such a variance would have mandated reversal of the Hobbs Act
convictions. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217-18 (1960).
277. 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
278. Id. at 218-19.
279. Id. at 218.
280. 718 F.2d at 1515-16 (quoting Record at 1-2).
281. 718 F.2d at 1516.
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that such an interference is not a sufficiently substantial interference
with interstate commerce. 28 2 Because the Tenth Circuit had not previ-
ously decided how much interference is required, it looked to the deci-
sions of several other circuits concerning the issue. The court adopted
the decisions of several circuits which hold that any de minimis effect on
interstate commerce is sufficient to sustain federal jurisdiction under the
Hobbs Act.2 83 The specific language of the Act prohibits interference
"in any way or degree."'2 84 The court then followed the other circuits by
holding that evidence of depletion of assets can show a large enough
effect to meet this "de minimis" standard.
2 85
By adopting the depletion of assets test, the Tenth Circuit has given
federal prosecutors within the circuit a powerful tool to bring more
crimes into federal jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act. But this test may
not be applied to every entity which may deal in interstate commerce.
The extortionate act must deplete the assets of a business and not an
individual. 286 As stated in United States v. Boulahanis,2 8 7 the justification
for this distinction is that "extortion is likely to have a greater effect on
interstate commerce when directed at businesses than at
individuals.,"288
The required nexus between the extortionate act and the effect on
interstate commerce has become increasingly tenuous. Because inter-
ference with interstate commerce need only be a "potential" result of
the depletion of assets, the required effect upon interstate commerce is
in danger of becoming "assumed by the courts for jurisdictional pur-
poses." 2 89 In order to resist this trend, the Tenth Circuit should apply
the depletion of assets test only where the business whose assets are
depleted is engaged in customary or ongoing dealings in interstate com-
merce.2 90 Such a limitation would give substance to the interference re-
quirement. If limits are not placed on the interference requirement the
scope of the Hobbs Act will continue to expand to the point where any
extortion or robbery would fall within its purview. Such a situation
would amount to an undesirable usurpation of jurisdiction from state




283. Id. (citing United States v. Glynn, 627 F.2d 39, 41 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Harding, 563 F.2d 299. 301-02 (6th Cir. 1977). cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978)).
284. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982).
285. 718 F.2d at 516 (citing United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586, 589-90 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982); United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1173 n.20
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916, 985; 452 U.S. 905 (1981); United States v.
French, 628 F.2d 1069, 1075-78 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980); United States
v. Daley, 564 F.2d 645, 649-50 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978)).
286. United States v. Mattson, 671 F.2d 1020, 1024-25 (7th Cir. 1982).
287. 677 F.2d 586 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982).
288. Id. at 590.
289. Note, Prosecution Under the Hobbs Act, supra note 265, at 314.
290. See United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d at 590; United States v. Elders, 569 F.2d
1020, 1025 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Merolla, 523 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1975).
291. See United States v. French, 628 F.2d at 1077 (dictum).
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